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Background
Phishing in its broadest sense can be defined as a scalable act of deception whereby 
impersonation is used by an attacker to obtain information from an individual (i.e., the 
target) [1]. The most common form of online phishing involves the sending of a decep-
tive message or email which at some point redirects the victims to a legitimate-looking, 
but malicious website. Once at the website, victims willingly enter their credentials (e.g., 
usernames and passwords), and maybe even financial information, under the belief that 
the website they are on is legitimate.
In the last decade there has been significant progress towards preventing and detecting 
phishing attacks. This progress has come in the form of plug-ins and extensions to detect 
phishing attempts, machine learning algorithms based on source code features, comprehen-
sive blacklists and whitelists, and others. Moreover, even novel gamification approaches have 
been proposed such as anti-phishing games, to help individuals learn to identify phishing 
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websites better and faster  [2]. After all of these efforts however, researchers still note that 
there is a lack of existing anti-phishing solutions considered as an optimum [3], while some 
believe that no static technical defence measure can solely mitigate the threat introduced by 
user behaviour [4]. The fact is that perpetrators of phishing attacks are continuously adapting 
their tricks to find novel ways of causing losses to individuals and organisations [5, 6].
From a financial perspective, the impact of phishing attacks is enormous. In the UK 
alone, the City of London Polices National Fraud Intelligence Bureau (NFIB) and the Get 
Safe Online security awareness campaign, reported that phishing scams costed victims 
174 million during 2015 [7]. In the organisational domain, the most recent FBI Internet 
Crime Report showed that in 2014 more than $11 million USD was lost due to govern-
ment impersonation e-mail scams only  [8]. Industry can suffer significantly as well, as 
current studies estimate that the total annual cost of phishing for some average-sized 
organisations could be around $3.77 million USD [9].
As other research articles have emphasised, if we hope to develop enhanced tools and 
effective strategies to reduce the successfulness of phishing attacks, we must first know 
how and why people fall for phishing schemes [10, 11]. This understanding could poten-
tially lead to superior techniques which would help individuals in accurately detecting 
phishing attacks. The aim of this article, therefore, is to critically investigate the key fac-
tors that influence individuals’ susceptibility to phishing attacks. We scope our study to 
explore what happens after people are redirected to malicious websites. Do they know 
how to detect a phishing web page? If yes, why? What factors result in people attributing 
the phishing label to a certain page?
Our research aims are summarised as follows. Firstly, we will search for correlations 
between certain characteristics of an individual and how vulnerable they are to falling 
for phishing attacks once on a malicious website. Secondly, this work will investigate 
what aspects of a web page are most used for accurately detecting phishing attacks (for 
example, is the padlock indicator in a browser as crucial as one may expect). Also, we 
seek to examine what aspects are mostly missed when looking at a malicious website. 
Finally, we will attempt to correlate the time users spent on each page with the success of 
detecting phishing attacks, and potentially even draw conclusions on how much time a 
user would need to be a good manual detector of malicious sites.
Literature review
Though the specific origins of phishing may be deliberated, Symantec notes that the first 
instances of such attack they witnessed occurred in the 1990s on AOL [12]. The attack 
vector of choice featured misleading instant messages and emails, which were used to 
trick users into revealing their AOL passwords, thus granting unauthorised access to 
their accounts. Since then, phishing has evolved substantially. Initially, there were the 
generic emails, typically containing several grammatical mistakes, wrongly addressed 
and directly requesting sensitive information. Now however, with the advent of spear-
phishing where attacks target specific people and enterprises, likely for some financial 
or access gain, attacks have become significantly more tailored  [13]. That is, they are 
professionally composed, directly addressed and cleverly disguise their real intentions. It 
may be hardly surprising then that studies have found that it takes about 82 seconds for 
cybercriminals to ensnare the first victim of a phishing campaign [14].
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In an attempt to address the broad phishing threat, a variety of countermeasures 
have been proposed. These seek to focus on the many components of the problem, and 
advance techniques for mitigation. Mohammad et al. for instance, critically explore the 
legal proposals and the educational process as a solution [15]. Although they find use-
ful and valuable proposals in this space, they conclude that law enforcement has the 
downside of a time-inefficient process given the average phishing website’s time-to-live, 
while the educational process is very difficult to implement in practice. On the topic of 
phishing education and awareness, there are a number of publications. These offer a 
range of guidelines, training systems, games, and apps [2, 16–18]. Industry has also put 
forward anti-phishing training suites, one of the most popular being that of Wombat 
Security [19].
In addition to the education-focused work, many technical prevention and detection 
mechanisms can found in the literature. Heuristic-based approaches are one of the most 
novel, and rely on detecting phishing attacks given certain features of emails or web 
pages. These features are fed into machine learning algorithms which try to correctly 
identify malicious phishing attempts. A popular browser extension which correlates 
machine learning with results on search engines is CANTINA+ [20], while an analysis 
of the performance of different machine learning approaches has also been made [21]. 
To complement such work, visual aids for phishing prevention have been explored. 
These target the fact that phishing websites rely heavily on the visual similarity with the 
actual websites the user intends to visit. The idea behind Security Skins [22] therefore, is 
that the remote server can identify itself by providing visual aid that is user-specific and 
easy to recognise. An implementation of this method is Yahoo’s Sign-In Seals [23].
Credentials (e.g., passwords) are not the only method for securing online accounts 
from unauthorised users (such as, after successful phishing attacks). Post-password 
actions refer to technical methods which are applied after the user enters a correct pass-
word. These methods try to detect if anything suspicious is taking place based on aspects 
such as geo-location and/or the user’s behaviour (e.g., two-factor authentication). This 
type of defence strategy has been referred to by some authors as one of the best cli-
ent-side defences against hijacking  [24]. Finally, there are many comprehensive lists of 
known phishing sites. Both Google and Microsoft maintain their own blacklists and 
other known solutions are PhishTank [25] and AIWL [26].
Another area that research has investigated is that of why individuals fall for phishing 
attacks. Early articles found that some users simply do not look at browser based-cues 
such as security indicators and the address bar, and even sophisticated users could be 
fooled by visual deception [10]. Somewhat surprisingly, recent research has found simi-
lar issues in the lack of attention paid to security indicators, and poor performance in 
identifying phishing websites [27]. In terms of user-based factors influencing the likeli-
hood to be successfully phished, studies have discovered that gender, age and exposure 
to educational materials all have some impact [28]. Other work has explored user char-
acteristics in more detail and identified that user extraversion, trust and submissiveness 
represent aspects that prevent victims from suspecting phishing attacks [29].
While research works such as those mentioned above have greatly advanced the field 
of phishing prevention and detection, we believe there are some areas, particularly in 
the individuals’ susceptibility to phishing attacks, still to be addressed. These include, 
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consideration of a broad range of factors (demographic and page-specific), assessing the 
impact of phishing attacks via browser popups, and more thorough analysis into what 
areas on web pages users assess to determine page legitimacy. It is these aspects there-
fore, that form the goals of this paper.
Methods
Overview
To fulfil the aims of this research, we designed and conducted a web-based user study. At 
its core, the methodology for this study involved: recruiting a set of participants; gather-
ing information (including demographic data) about them; presenting them with sites 
and requesting that they differentiate between legitimate and phishing pages; and finally, 
analysing their responses and other related data to draw conclusions. In what follows, we 
expand on the various components of this methodology.
Using the research aims, we first set about designing the details of the study itself in 
terms of its flow, the types of sites to be presented and how we would analyse the data. 
Then we set up the site supporting the study such that when participants accessed the 
landing page, they were briefed about the scope of the research project and asked to 
read a short description of the study structure and what was about to happen. If the 
participants agreed to participate, they were taken to the next page where we gathered 
basic demographic and user-related information. The questions asked were about partic-
ipants’ age, gender, education level, profession, computer experience, whether they had 
been targeted or victims of phishing attacks before (and any losses), whether they had 
received any phishing awareness training, and their perception on how likely they were 
to detect all phishing attacks in the study.
After submitting demographic information, participants were presented with images 
specifically designed for this research. These images were harmless representations of 
phishing and legitimate websites; an important point from an ethical perspective. In 
order to make the study as close as possible to a real phishing scenario, we implemented 
a fullscreen page API.1 Moreover, by hovering their cursor over specific areas of the 
images, participants were able to identify useful information about the web page includ-
ing security certificate information, button links, and basic source code. This was setup 
to mirror real web pages and to allow participants to move their mouse in the areas they 
were actually inspecting. To capture this mouse movement data and gain further insight 
into participants’ thought process, we used MouseFlow,2 a website heatmap and session 
replay tool.
For the actual study, the task of participants was straightforward. To each image they 
were shown, they were asked, ‘Would you enter your login credentials on this webpage?’, 
with two possible answers: ‘Yes’ or ‘No’. Answers were recorded to enable analysis of the 
data at a later stage. Participants were given no option of going back once they submit-
ted an answer. Lastly, before launching the study, we ran a one-week pilot, with individu-
als of various backgrounds, and made improvements to the study as necessary.
1 http://davidwalsh.name/fullscreen
2 https://mouseflow.com/.
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Images design
For our study, we decided to limit the scope, and thus the images and pages used, to a 
single domain; namely, facebook.com. This gave us the opportunity in this particular 
experiment to focus only on the elements we wanted to change and test against, as 
opposed to full sites. Facebook was selected as it is the second most visited site in the 
world according to Alexa,3 and also, a treasure trove for attackers interested in identity 
theft, attacking corporations and a host of other threats.
The images displayed to participants alternated between two elements that could be 
identified by a user in order to detect a phishing attempt: the URL or link and the https 
indicator (security certificate). Source code fragments were also displayed when hover-
ing the cursor over certain sections in the images but this was only done to reduce the 
bias towards the elements that needed inspection and provide a uniform experience. 
Every image was designed to replicate three different browsers (Chrome, Firefox, Inter-
net Explorer) to offer participants a familiar interface where they could focus on detect-
ing phishing. As a result, we designed a total of 39 images, 13 images for each browser, 
and organised them into three different groupings (hereafter, contexts) of pages each.
Context 1 displayed six images based on the login page of Facebook. Only the https 
and URL aspects were modified, and for ease of reference, we summarise those modifi-
cations in Table 1.
In detail, the first image in this context had a URL which denoted a regular, unpro-
tected channel of communication but, more importantly, it had three ‘o’ letters instead 
of two. As such, we considered this page to be a malicious one. Figure 1 displays this 
page and serves as a visual example of pages from this context. The second image still 
presented an unprotected channel of communication, but had the correct spelling of 
Facebook. We considered this page to be legitimate since http only does not neces-
sarily imply phishing. In fact, at the moment, not many pages offer SSL/TLS certificates 
with only 23.4 % of the 150,000 most popular websites being reported by the trustworthy 
internet movement to use SSL/TLS [30]. Above all, this image could lead to interesting 
findings about how people perceive websites, and particularly phishing sites as it relates 
to the use of security certificates.
The third image was of a correct Facebook login page over https and had a redi-
rect variable at the end. Its purpose was to test whether participants would know what 
to make of the content of the URL that followed the correct domain. This page was 
regarded as legitimate. The fourth image was designed to be a somewhat more challeng-
ing one. We hypothesised that in the first image participants may focus on the middle 
section of the link (3 o’s), in the second they may focus on the beginning part (http 
only), and in the third one, at the end of the link (?_rdr). For this image therefore, we 
corrected only the beginning and end, but reintroduced the triple o’s; thus making it a 
phishing page.
The fifth image was of the standard correct https Facebook login page, while the 
sixth image introduced a facebook subdomain on secure.com with a longer link. This 
latter image was considered to be a phishing attempt, and our goal was to investigate 
3 http://www.alexa.com/topsites.
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whether individuals would know the difference between the domain and subdomain of a 
given web page.
Context 2 displayed three images based on a Facebook page that warned partici-
pants that their passwords needed to be changed. An example of such a page can be 
seen in Fig. 2, and a summary of the characteristics of the pages is available in Table 2. 
Before actually presenting this new set of images, we notified participants via a short 
text about the change of context (i.e., types of screens). The text asked participants to 
now assume that they followed a link in a message purporting to be from Facebook. The 
Table 1 Images of web pages—Context 1
# Detailed characteristics URL
1 http only + faceboook (3 o’s) http://www.faceboook.com
2 http only http://www.facebook.com
3 https + redirect (rdr) https://www.facebook.com/?_rdr
4 https + faceboook (3 o’s) https://www.faceboook.com
5 https https://www.facebook.com
6 https + subdomain secure.com + long link https://facebook.secure.com/?_apiKey=[...]
Fig. 1 First web page from Context 1. This screenshot represents Page #1 in the study, and is defined by the 
following characteristics: http only and faceboook (3 o’s)
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message informed them of a security breach and thus, the need for them to login to their 
accounts and change their passwords.
The first page in this context again used the misspelled faceboook.com and had a long 
URL/link as well; this was considered a malicious site. The next image was of a phish-
ing page with an inaccurate internet protocol (IP) URL and a long link, while the third 
image of this context represented a legitimate, secure Facebook login which also had a 
longer link. Our objective with these images was to assess whether the security notifica-
tion might have a some notable impact on participants’ behaviour.
Context 3 presented the most varied layout thus far, displaying four images with pop-
ups shown on two web domains which required authentication in order to access the 
full content. The two domains used were wsj.com (i.e., the Wall Street Journal) and 
Fig. 2 First web page from Context 2. This screenshot represents Page #7 in the study, and is defined by the 
following characteristics: faceboook (3 o’s) + long link
Table 2 Images of web pages—Context 2
# Detailed characteristics (https + update alert) URL
7 faceboook (3 o’s) + long link https://www.faceboook.com/login.php?[...]
8 IP + long link https://128.237.239.92/facebook/login.php?[...]
9 long link https://www.facebook.com/login.php?[...]
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catvideooftheweek.com (i.e., a miscellaneous cat video website). For a summary of the 
characteristics of the pages in this context, see Table  3. In order to keep participants 
engaged, we introduced the context with a short piece of text. On this occasion, we 
explained that some websites require user login to access their information, and for this 
context participants should assume that they were somewhat interested in such content. 
They were then told that the question of entering their credentials information would 
now refer to the pop-up box.
The first pop-up introduced a facebook subdomain of the Wall Street Journal 
domain, wsj.com; therefore representing a phishing site. A key goal in this context 
was to assess whether there was any difference between individuals’ perception of a 
regular subdomain link versus the pop-up subdomain link. The second image of this 
context displayed a correct Facebook pop-up on wsj.com, while the final two images 
depicted phishing attempt pop-ups with the same domain as the parent page: cat-
videooftheweek.com. Figure 3 shows an example of this context’s images, with Page 12. 
The only difference between the last two phishing attempts was that one of them had 
an unprotected communication channel while the other offered a secure link for the 
pop-up.
Summarizing, each participant was shown 13 images, of which 7 were considered 
phishing attempts while the others were representations of legitimate websites. We paid 
special attention to make the images as similar as possible to a real desktop, avoiding any 
bias that our web page could introduce.
Ethics, recruitment and data collection
The study was launched on May 2015 and over a period of a month we gathered partici-
pants’ information. Our recruitment drive mainly involved advertising the study through 
social media and email, using research and industrial contacts. In the study itself, we col-
lected the following data: participant demographics and user-related data; responses to 
the questions regarding the presented images; time spent on each page; the cursor move-
ment on these pages; and optionally, email addresses if participants wished to receive the 
study’s results and further details about phishing prevention. As mentioned, the cursor 
tracking information was gathered and stored by a third party tool (MouseFlow) and 
allowed us to collect more quantitative information related to participants page actions. 
This study received ethical clearance from the University of Oxford Research Ethics 
Committee to be conducted.
Table 3 Images of web pages—Context 3
# Detailed characteristics (popup) URL
10 https + subdomain wsj.com + long link https://facebook.wsj.com/login.php?[...]
11 https + facebook + long link https://www.facebook.com/login.php?[...]
12 cats + http only same domain + long link http://catvideooftheweek.com/facebookLogin.php?[...]
13 https + cats + same domain + long link https://catvideooftheweek.com/facebookLogin.php?[...]
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Data analysis
Analysing the data gathered involved several tasks. Firstly, we conducted an overview 
analysis which was coded using PHP, MySQL and a charting API called Highcharts.4 We 
gained an overview of our population sample, of the time spent in our study, and also of 
other individual page results such as the rate of success and failure for each page (i.e., 
detection score). Secondly, using IBM’s SPSS software,5 we applied an ANOVA (analysis 
of variance) test for every user feature to determine whether any statistically significant 
difference of means among groups existed; here, groups relate to categories of the inde-
pendent variables, such as male and female. We then analysed the probability (p-value) 
of obtaining the data assuming the null hypothesis which states that all population 
means are equal. A p value <0.05 was considered as significant. Moreover, we ran a Tuk-
ey’s post hoc procedure to compare all different combinations of the treatment groups.
When reporting statistical results in the next section, we present details of the F-ratio 
and the degrees of freedom from which it was calculated, the effect size η2, and the p 
value. Finally, since cursor tracking information was collected by MouseFlow, we 
4 http://www.highcharts.com/.
5 http://www-01.ibm.com/software/analytics/spss/.
Fig. 3 Third web page from Context 3. This screenshot represents Page #12 in the study, and is defined by 
the following characteristics: cats + http only same domain + long link
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inspected the heatmaps generated by this tool. This was done for every individual page 
to attain an understanding of the summarised cursor movements on these pages. Analy-
sis and conclusions pertaining to this data were based on our visual interface.
Results and discussion
Participant sample
In one month after the launch of our study, 382 individuals fully completed the study, 
while 556 individuals had passed the initial demographic questions page. For our analy-
ses, we only considered those who had fully completed the study. An overview of the 
demographics and information of the participant sample is next.
In total, we registered 240 male participants (62.83  %) and 142 female participants 
(37.17 %). The age group 18–24 accounted for 50 % of the sample but we also had five 
participants over 60 years old. Most of the participants were either currently studying for 
a university degree or had already completed one, with only 5.76 % selecting high school 
or less. In terms of location, out of the 21 countries we had participants from, Romania 
and the UK hold more than 80 % of the total, with 61.78 and 21.20 % respectively; these 
were the two countries where the recruitment drive was the most significant. 53.14 % of 
our participants were employed and 43.19 % were students. Most of our users had more 
than 6  years of PC usage. Overall, 65.71  % of our participants had been subjected to 
phishing attacks with under 6 % of these declaring financial or credentials losses. 19.90 % 
do not know if they were exposed to phishing attacks, while 14.40  % think they were 
never subjected to such attacks. Only 21 people across the sample had phishing training 
before, which accounts for 5.50 % out of participants.
Plenty of phish in the sea
The first main finding from our study was that phishing still is a significant concern. We 
found that the average success rate of detecting a phishing site in our study is 65.63 % 
with only six participants attaining a 100 % score. Even more concerning, only a total of 
26 people scored more than 90 % correct. This situation acts to confirm prior research 
and reiterate the seriousness of the problem. One question that occurred to us hav-
ing seen such a score, was whether our decision to consider the Page 2 in the study as 
legitimate dramatically affected the results. Indeed, we did mention in our image design 
section that this page would be one of particular interest. As such, we re-ran the analy-
sis considering the http only Facebook login image as a phishing page. The results 
showed that the average success rate was slightly lower in this configuration (63.83 %). 
However, an improved result was that nine participants now scored 100 % correct.
We also analysed the data of participants who performed poorly in the study. If a par-
ticipant would have responded to all answers with a ‘no’, their detection score would have 
been 53 %. However, 37 of our participants received an even lower score than this which 
denotes a worrying reality. As we have witnessed, such attacks can cost corporations sig-
nificant amounts [9]. Our results seem to agree with a recent study which showed that 
people fall for the most obvious phishing pages 3 % of the time, for the average phishing 
pages 14 % of the time, while the most believable phishing pages trick users 45 % of the 
time [24].
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Confidence level
Before presenting the images of this study to our participants, we asked them how likely 
it was that they would detect all the phishing pages in the study. They had five options 
to choose from: very low probability, low probability, sort of random, high probability, 
and very high probability. On completing the study, we asked the same question again, 
therefore recording the confidence level before and after the study. After analysing the 
data, we discovered that only 11.52 % of our participants reported a higher confidence 
level after completing the study, while 39.01  % reported a decreased confidence level. 
The remaining 49.48  % selected the same value of confidence level with almost all of 
them reporting a level of sort of random or below. We hypothesise that the high percent-
age of decreased confidence levels along with the high percentage of participants that 
entered their email addresses to find out more about phishing, could be an indicator that 
the study successfully challenged participants to take phishing more seriously.
Statistically, ANOVA results suggest that there exist correlations between the initial 
confidence level and the detection scores, F(4, 377) = 12.664, η2 = 0.11, p = 0.000 , 
as well as between the final confidence level and the detection scores, 
F(4, 377) = 13.651, η2 = 0.12, p = 0.000. From a comparison of the mean scores of 
the final confidence level in particular, we noticed that participants were much better at 
judging their performance.
Demographic feature analysis
As mentioned earlier, we collected user demographics and other information across sev-
eral features. For each of these features, we ran one-way ANOVA tests in order to deter-
mine if they were linked with the detection scores or with the time each participant took 
in the study. Some of the main results of the ANOVA are listed in Table 4. Here, due to 
space restrictions, we only provide details about the features that were statistically sig-
nificant for either the detection score or the time spent.
Similar to other studies, our results show that there is a statistically signifi-
cant difference between males and females in detecting phishing web pages, 
F(1, 380) = 13.467, η2 = 0.034, p = 0.000. Sheng et  al. relate this difference to the 
supposed less technical experience that women have compared to men [28]. PC usage 
also has an impact on phishing detection. In our analysis, this feature was statistically 
significant for both the detection score, F(3, 378) = 5.495, η2 = 0.041, p = 0.001, as 
well as the time spent on the study, F(3, 378) = 2.837, η2 = 0.022, p = 0.038. This 
suggests that a longer interaction with computers (and probably the World Wide Web) 
Table 4 Demographic features analysis






PC usage Yes Yes
Browser No No
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contributes towards a better understanding of phishing attacks and detection strategies, 
therefore helping users to identify phishing web pages faster and more accurately.
The time spent on all the pages in our study is significantly correlated with age, 
F(8, 373) = 4.356, η2 = 0.085, p = 0.000 and profession, F(3, 378) = 4.682, η2 =
0.035, p = 0.03. One reason for this could be the possibility that older participants tend 
to be less impulsive and prefer to properly assess a site before making their decision. A 
similar reality may be true for individuals who are employed (as opposed to students, for 
instance); that is, general awareness or workplace training could have influenced them 
to think more carefully about such actions. This also related to another point: unem-
ployed participants spent on average almost the same time as students which account 
for the lowest amount of the time taken to complete the study. While we were unable to 
find a specific reason for this, we posited that lower risk awareness or potentially even 
education may have been a factor. Lastly, although in our analysis the country feature is 
statistically correlated with the detection scores, the population sizes of most countries 
are very small compared to those of the United Kingdom and Romania. As such, we are 
unable to definitively conclude that the country impacts detection scores.
Critical pages
Having discussed general study findings, we now focus our attention to assess the criti-
cal web pages. We define a critical web page as the page on which the set of participants 
failed more than they succeeded. From the thirteen images shown, Page 1 (P1), Page 4 
(P4) and Page 11 (P11) received more incorrect answers than correct ones. Figure 4 pre-
sents an overview of the numbers of successes and failures for each page. The green col-
our represents the number of correct answers given for each page while the red colour 
accounts for the incorrect ones.
Fig. 4 Successes and failures per page
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Despite the fact that the first page in our study had the highest average time spent on a 
page (25 s), 214 participants (56 %) entered an incorrect answer on it. This seems to sug-
gest that although participants allocated what seemed to be enough time to make a deci-
sion, they were still unable to correctly identify it as a phishing web page. Since this page 
was http only and displayed a misspelled “faceboook” (3 o’s), one question we asked 
is whether participants actually inspected the URL before giving their answer.
Therefore, we examined the cursor movement heatmap presented in Fig.  5. We can 
clearly see in the heatmap that most of the participants placed the cursor over the triple 
o’s. Also, the document icon which is specific for http only web pages accounted for 
even more of inspection. It might therefore be hypothesised that the reason for so many 
failures on this web page does not relate to participants not inspecting the URL or the 
security indicators displayed in the browser. Whilst we were unable to ascertain a rea-
son for this, we did wonder whether the answer was in a lack of knowledge about what 
https meant or the participant’s attention to detail. Generally speaking however, this is 
quite concerning, as participants are seemingly overlooking key indicators that may be 
used to detect phishing attacks.
Although our participants clearly considered Page 4 to be easier and spent an aver-
age of only 10 seconds on it, we designed it as quite the contrary. This page tested the 
hypothesis that the anchoring effect applies also to phishing. By definition, the anchor-
ing effect is a cognitive bias that influences someone to rely too heavily on the first piece 
of information they receive. As such, we tested whether the first three pages would influ-
ence the zones that participants inspected on the fourth one. Regarding the analysis of 
the first three pages, in the first two images users focused on the beginning part (http 
only) and the middle section of the link (3 o’s), while the third page obtained more 
focus on the end of the link (?_rdr). However, in the fourth image we corrected only 
the beginning and the end of the link but reintroduced the triple o’s in the middle.
Looking then at the cursor movement heatmap of the fourth page (Fig.  6), we can 
easily see that the middle part of the link was not inspected as much as it should have, 
Fig. 5 Heatmap for Page 1 (cropped)
Fig. 6 Heatmap for Page 4 (cropped)
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therefore somewhat supporting our hypothesis. As a likely result of the cognitive bias, 
this page accounts for the highest failure rate of all the pages in our study. 61 % of our 
participants submitted an incorrect answer and all of them spent an average of 10 sec-
onds to inspect the image.
The last critical page, Page 11, represented a page where a legitimate Facebook pop-up 
is displayed and logging in is required to show the full content of an article. Here, 51 % 
of our participants incorrectly labelled it as a phishing web page with an average time 
of 12 seconds spent to investigate its correctness. Whilst on the positive side, partici-
pants appear to have chosen the safe option (potentially when they are not able to con-
fidently determine the legitimacy of a page), this finding does raise questions about how 
individuals perceive pop-ups. Pop-ups are a valid way of web developers using federated 
identities to allow sign-in across websites, but being visually presented ‘over’ other sites 
and displaying slightly different, minimalistic interfaces, may act to confuse users online.
Where the mighty fall
Another question that we asked during the individual page analysis is this: where do par-
ticipants who only miss one page fail? Perhaps this will show what factors are mostly 
missed by people even when they have good knowledge of cues for detecting phishing 
attacks. Similar to before, whilst we maintain that Page 2 is legitimate, we also wanted 
to consider the scenario if it was regarded as a phishing site and the impact on the study 
results, if any. Figure  7 shows the number of participants who missed only one page 
when considering Page 2 to be legitimate in yellow, and the number of participants who 
missed only one page when considering Page 2 as a phishing attack in blue. In total, we 
have 20 participants in yellow and 13 in blue.
The first aspect to notice is that no matter the context, pages 2, 9, 10 and 11 account 
for wrong answers. Page 2, in particular, proved rather challenging as participants strug-
gled with whether or not http alone represented a phishing attack. In both situations, the 
Fig. 7 Number of fails on each page for the best participants
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number of fails are the highest over all the pages, being 6 and 9 respectively. This highlights 
an interesting question regarding the perception of https and what it really means. The 
context of Page 9 is a legitimate Facebook page which asks users to update their passwords. 
Page 10 (phishing) and Page 11 (legitimate) represent Facebook pop-ups which supposedly 
after a successful login would allow access to content on Wall Street Journal (wsj.com).
To add to this analysis, Fig. 8 presents the average time spent on each page by the most 
successful participants. When assessing these data, we can see that the failures on Pages 
2, 9, 10 and 11 can not necessarily always be explained by less time spent to inspect these 
pages. Therefore, we believe this finding may highlight at least two important points. 
Firstly, experienced users do not necessarily trust correct security indicators or notifica-
tions, and secondly, phishing attacks which rely on malicious pop-ups may be harder for 
users to detect.
Unfortunately, the first of these findings suggests that the slew of phishing attacks over 
the last decade may have impacted the trust that some users are placing in security cues. 
This could have a further impact on companies themselves in the long term, if users view 
online services as untrustworthy. Moreover, results suggest that when using pop-ups, 
perpetrators of phishing attacks could be more successful in their objective of deceiv-
ing users. On the positive side, however, if people knew how to detect malicious links 
in general, they could apply the same information for preventing phishing attacks which 
rely on pop-ups. Therefore, the number of cues that one would have to learn in order 
to correctly classify web pages does not increase when considering this new channel 
of phishing attacks. Overall however, it was encouraging to see that in two of the three 
cases, participants failed because they were more cautious than not.
Anti‑phishing training impact
As mentioned before, 21 participants received anti-phishing training at some point 
prior to taking this study. Our results show that the average detection score for the 
Fig. 8 Average time analysis for the best participants
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participants who received anti-phishing training is 67.10  %, while the other category 
had a detection score average of 65.55 %. Also, none of those who had received phish-
ing training before our study managed to score 100 %. We suspected that this could be 
related to Page 2 being considered as a correct one but when we changed it to a phish-
ing page, the maximum detection score for individuals who received training decreased 
even further, from 92 to 85 %. Lastly, we found that participants, who had phishing train-
ing before, took on average almost 20 s more to complete the tasks in the study.
While it is tempting to use these findings to posit that anti-phishing training is not 
effective, that would not be prudent given the small sample size of those who had such 
training; this small size is also our reason for not conducting ANOVA tests. Unfortu-
nately, we did not collect additional information on how recently participants had their 
training or the details of such training (e.g., a phishing game, printed materials, class ses-
sion), which also prevents any high-level insight on their perspective. This is an area for 
us to expand on in future work as studies have shown that training can have an impact 
on performance [17].
Phishing loss impact
Although most of our participants reported that there was no loss after being subjected 
to phishing attacks, 4.19 % reported that they lost their credentials after such attacks and 
1.31 % reported financial losses after being phished. We had hypothesised that partici-
pants who lost personal information during phishing attacks would be better at detect-
ing such attacks than the group of participants who have not because of their potential 
increased awareness. However, this was not the case after simple comparison across 
groups. We do caveat this finding with the fact that the group size was quite small, and 
therefore, findings are hardly conclusive.
We also attempted to gather some understanding as to whether there was any differ-
ence in detecting phishing between individuals who lost only credentials and those who 
lost financial data during phishing attacks; potentially the latter category would be much 
more prepared since the attacks reached their finances. Nonetheless, although partici-
pants who had financial losses had a better average than those who lost only credentials 
during phishing attacks (a 10 % difference), small sample sizes prohibit us from conduct-
ing proper tests for significance. In the future, we may look to explore this aspect further 
by specifically attempting to recruit a larger set of individuals who have suffered loss due 
to a phishing attack.
Limitations
While this research study has achieved its aims and identified key factors that influence 
individuals’ susceptibility to phishing attacks, there are two main limitations to be noted. 
The first limitation is that there was no smartphone support for the study. Although we 
ran a pilot study beforehand, our participants were all manually selected and used a PC 
to access and complete it. Immediately after the first post on Facebook to advertise the 
study, we noticed that many people accessed our landing page through mobile devices 
but unfortunately our study was not suited to be taken on a mobile device.
The second limitation was related to the use of mouse tracking versus eye tracking. 
Chen et al. present a study on the relationship between gaze position and cursor position 
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on a computer screen during web browsing  [31]. They concluded that mouse tracking 
is an inexpensive and scalable technique that has merit as an alternative to eye-track-
ing systems, especially in usability evaluations on the web. In order to have even more 
meaningful mouse tracking data, we gave the users an incentive to move the mouse in 
the areas they were inspecting by showing pop-up boxes with additional information 
(thereby mirroring typical browser behaviour). However, we do acknowledge that mouse 
tracking may not be as exact as eye tracking. For further work therefore, we could con-
sider conducting the same study on a smaller sample using eye tracking, to examine the 
differences if any.
Conclusions and future work
Although in the last decade significant progress has been made to prevent phish-
ing attacks, it seems that by continuously adapting their bait, attackers are still able to 
trick and exploit some users. This study shows that when on a malicious web page, peo-
ple will fall for phishing schemes with an average success rate of detecting phishing of 
65.63 %. Moreover, in our study, only six participants attained a 100 % detection score 
which accounts for 1 % of the total population sample. By running statistical tests on our 
data, we identified that gender and the years of PC usage have a significant impact on the 
detection scores. This acts to reinforce some aspects of earlier literature.
While conducting an individual page analysis which correlated detection scores, time 
spent on each page, and cursor position heatmaps, we reported that many of the par-
ticipants who failed to correctly identify only one page in our study had missed phishing 
attacks which relied on pop-ups. Therefore, we concluded that these kinds of attacks are 
harder to detect; future analysis may highlight that the reputation of the parent page of 
the pop-up might have an impact on correctly spotting phishing attacks. Also, the study 
showed that the anchoring effect is present when detecting phishing. Heatmaps sup-
ported our hypothesis, thus suggesting that recent history has an impact on the ability of 
people to detect phishing web pages.
To briefly reflect on our research in the context of existing literature, we believe that 
we have contributed in two important ways. First, we extend current knowledge on fac-
tors that influence phishing susceptibility (e.g., gender, PC usage, user extraversion, trust 
and submissiveness [28, 29]) by identifying new aspects such as the use of pop-up based 
attacks and the psychological anchoring effect. This is extremely useful as it highlights 
new areas where individuals may be vulnerable and therefore, need more protection. We 
also highlight that there are numerous factors that we demonstrated do not impact an 
individual’s likelihood to be phished; this can inform and allow better scoping of future 
research. Next, our research further supported current literature, and in many ways, 
actually provides clear evidence to explain previous findings. For instance, literature has 
found that users simply do not look at browser based-cues such as security indicators 
and the address bar, hence fall for attacks [10]. We provide clear evidence in support of 
this finding, and the fact that some users may not even understand the security implica-
tions of the cues that they are looking at; this was achieved through the tracking and 
analysis of exactly where the user moves their mouse as they consider phishing and legit-
imate web pages.
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There are many avenues for future research in this space. One immediate area to 
extend this current study could be exploring the susceptibility to phishing attacks in 
mobile device interfaces. Studies have already began to consider the general problem of 
phishing on mobiles and the increasing number of possible attacks [32]. However, there 
is need for more work on understanding the key factors that impact users’ susceptibility 
here. For instance, we could investigate whether the same factors arise, or different ones 
exist; one main point of course, being the size of such devices. This could be interest-
ing especially if we consider the Internet-of-Things and the various sorts of low resolu-
tion devices, and phishing attacks that might be launched. Then, the goal would be to 
create enhanced approaches to respond to such attacks, whether they be technical or 
educational-based.
To consider on our work more broadly, the aim of this research was to understand 
the susceptibility of individuals to phishing attacks and the key related factors, to then 
use them for better prevention and detection. From what we have learned in this article, 
there are two main areas that we will aim to focus on in the future. Firstly, we will seek to 
design and develop technical solutions by way of web browser extensions. The sensitiv-
ity of these extensions for providing warnings of potential phishing sites will be adapted 
based on user’s characteristics; i.e., the extensions would be such that the more vulner-
able types of users potentially receive more, and increasingly tailored warnings. We will 
take inspiration from research on discovering likely phishing attacks  [3], and develop-
ments on effectively communicating warnings to users [33, 34].
Secondly, we aim to produce highly focused educational and training approaches that 
consolidate the various contributions thus far on the most effective ways to assist users 
in avoiding phishing attacks. Even though our study was unable to clearly identify phish-
ing training as useful, largely due to the small sample size, other research on the effec-
tiveness of training has been quite promising [17, 35, 36]. In both these areas, we aim 
to draw on the wide array of research on users in terms of risk understanding and com-
munication, and mental models of security [37, 38]. Whilst we do not believe phishing 
is a problem that can be solved easily, there are several steps that can and must be taken 
in an attempt to address it before the range and impact of attacks become even more 
significant.
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